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Abstract
Turing test was originally proposed to examine
whether machine’s behavior is indistinguishable from
a human. The most popular and practical Turing
test is CAPTCHA, which is to discriminate algorithm
from human by offering recognition-alike questions.
The recent development of deep learning has signifi-
cantly advanced the capability of algorithm in solv-
ing CAPTCHA questions, forcing CAPTCHA de-
signers to increase question complexity. Instead of
designing questions difficult for both algorithm and
human, this study attempts to employ the limita-
tions of algorithm to design robust CAPTCHA ques-
tions easily solvable to human. Specifically, our
data analysis observes that human and algorithm
demonstrates different vulnerability to visual distor-
tions: adversarial perturbation is significantly an-
noying to algorithm yet friendly to human. We
are motivated to employ adversarially perturbed im-
ages for robust CAPTCHA design in the context of
character-based questions. Three modules of multi-
target attack, ensemble adversarial training, and im-
age preprocessing differentiable approximation are
proposed to address the characteristics of character-
based CAPTCHA cracking. Qualitative and quanti-
tative experimental results demonstrate the effective-
ness of the proposed solution. We hope this study
can lead to the discussions around adversarial at-
Figure 1: Increasing content complexity of
CAPTCHAs.
tack/defense in CAPTCHA design and alsp inspire
the future attempts in employing algorithm limita-
tion for practical usage.
1 Introduction
Alan Turing first proposed the Turing Test ques-
tion “Can machines think like human?” [14] Turing
test was initially designed to examine machine’s ex-
hibited intelligent behavior that is indistinguishable
from a human, and later developed into a form of
reverse Turing test with more practical goal of dis-
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tinguishing between computer and human. Among
reverse Turing tests, CAPTCHA (Completely Au-
tomated Public Turing test to tell Computers and
Humans Apart) turns out the most well-known one
used in anti-spam systems to prevent abuse use of
automated programs [17].
Most early CAPTCHAs, like the reCAPTCHA [25]
which assists in the digitization of Google books, be-
long to the traditional character-based scheme in-
volving with only numbers and English characters.
With the fast progress of machine learning espe-
cially deep learning algorithms, simple character-
based CAPTCHAs fail to distinguish between algo-
rithm and human [4] [22] [16]. CAPTCHA designers
were therefore forced to increase the complexity of
content to be recognized. As shown in Fig. 1, while
the extremely complex CAPTCHAs reduce the risks
to be cracked by algorithms, it also heavily increase
the burden of human recognition. It is noteworthy
that the effectiveness of simply increasing content
complexity is based on the assumption that human
has consistently superior recognition capability than
algorithm. The last few years have witnessed human-
level AI in tasks like image recognition [10], speech
processing [7] and even reading comprehension [20].
It is easy to imagine that with the further develop-
ment of algorithms, continuously increasing content
complexity will reach such a critical point that algo-
rithm can recognize yet human cannot recognize.
Let’s review the initial goal of CAPTCHA: to dis-
criminate human from algorithm by designing tasks
unsolvable to algorithms. Therefore, the straight-
forward solution is to employ the limitations of al-
gorithms to facilitate CAPTCHA design. While al-
gorithms have advanced their performance in many
perspectives including visual/vocal recognition accu-
racy, they remain some notorious limitations with
regards to human [15]. Researchers and practition-
ers already employed such limitations to design new
form of CAPTCHAs, e.g., developing cognitive [18]
and sequentially related [6] questions to challenge al-
gorithm’s lack of commonsense knowledge and poor
contextual reasoning ability.
Following this spirit, we are interested to ex-
plore the possibility of improving the robustness
of CAPTCHA towards algorithm cracking with-
out changing the traditional character-based scheme.
In other words, is it possible to design character
CAPTCHAs only friendly to human instead of simply
increasing content complexity? The key lies in finding
the algorithm limitation compatible to the scheme of
character image. One candidate is the vulnerability
to visual distortions. We have conducted data anal-
ysis and observed that human and algorithm exhibit
different vulnerability to visual distortions (the ob-
servations are detailed in Section 2). This inspires
us to exploit those distortions friendly to human but
obstructing algorithm to pollute the original char-
acter CAPTCHA. Specifically, adversarial perturba-
tion [24] exactly meets this requirement: adversarial
attack 1 and CAPTCHA share the common intention
that human are imperceptible to but algorithm are
significantly affected by the same distortion. The no-
torious characteristic of adversarial perturbation for
visual understanding turns out to be the desired one
for CAPTCHA design.
Inspired by this, we employ adversarial perturba-
tion to design robust character-based CAPTCHA in
this study. Current state-of-the-art cracking solution
views CAPTCHA OCR(Optical Character Recog-
nition) as a sequential recognition problem [9] [1].
To remove the potential distortions, further image
preprocessing operations are typically added before
OCR. Correspondingly in this study, we propose to
simultaneously attack multiple targets to address the
sequential recognition issue (Section 3.1) and differ-
entiably approximate image preprocessing operations
in the adversarial example generation process to can-
cel out their potential influence (Section 3.3). More-
over, since we have no knowledge about the detailed
algorithm the cracking solution used (e.g., neural net-
work structure), the generated adversarial examples
are expected to be resistent to unknown OCR algo-
rithms in the black-box cracking. This study resorts
1 Adversarial attack refers to the process of adding
small but specially crafted perturbation to generate ad-
versarial examples misleading algorithm. To avoid con-
fusion with the process of attacking CAPTCHA, in this
study, we use “adversarial attack” to indicate the gen-
eration of adversarially distorted CAPTCHAs and use
“CAPTCHA crack” to indicate the attempt of passing
CAPTCHA with algorithms.
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Figure 2: Human v.s. algorithm vulnerability analysis results on Gaussian and adversarial distortions
this issue to ensemble adversarial training by gener-
ating adversarial examples effective towards multiple
algorithms (Section 3.2). In summary, the contribu-
tions of this study are two-fold:
• We have discovered the different vulnerability
between human and algorithm on visual distor-
tions. Based on the observations, adversarial
perturbation is employed to improve the robust-
ness of character-based CAPTCHA.
• Corresponding to the characteristics of typical
OCR cracking solutions, we proposed a novel
methodology addressing issues including sequen-
tial recognition, indifferentiable image prepro-
cessing, and black-box cracking.
2 Data Analysis
To justify the feasibility of employing algorithm lim-
itations for CAPTCHA design and motivate our de-
tailed solution, this section conducts data analysis
to answer two questions: (1) Whether human and
algorithm have different vulnerability to visual dis-
tortion? (2) What characteristics to consider when
employing distortions to design robust CAPTCHA?
Text-based CAPTCHA is the most widely de-
ployed scheme requiring subjects recognize characters
from 0-9 and A-Z. Due to its simplicity, character-
based CAPTCHA is very effective to examine the
robustness towards cracking algorithm as well as
friendliness to human. Therefore, this study employs
character-based CAPTCHA as the example scheme
to conduct data analysis, develop solution and imple-
ment experiments. Specifically, during data analysis,
we assume that each CAPTCHA question is consti-
tuted by single character in a RGB image with unique
resolution of 48×64px. The character font is fixed as
DroidSansMono. The remainder of the section will
report the observations regarding human and char-
acter recognition performance in different scenarios.
2.1 Vulnerability Analysis to Visual
Distortion
This subsection designs character recognition compe-
tition between human and algorithm to analyze their
vulnerability to visual distortions. We employed two
types of visual distortions: (1) Gaussian white noise
is one usual distortion to generate CAPTCHAs [3]. In
this study, the added one-time Gaussian white noise
follows normal distribution with mean µ˜ = 0, vari-
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Figure 3: The affection of image preprocessing: (a)
distorted characters before (top row) and after (bot-
tom row) image binarization; (b)Recognition accu-
racy on adversarially distorted characters.
ance σ˜ = 0.01 and constant power spectral density.
(2) Adversarial perturbation has been recognized as
imperceptile to human but significantly confusing al-
gorithm. We employ the widely used FGSM [8] to
add adversarial perturbation, where one-time pertur-
bation is constituted with step size of 0.02. To ex-
amine the change of recognition performance with in-
creasing distortion difficulty, we added 8 levels of dis-
tortions onto the original character images accumula-
tively: each level corresponds to 5 one-time Gaussian
white noises and adversarial perturbations respec-
tively. Examples for derived distorted CAPTCHA
images in different levels are illustrated in Fig. 2(a)
and (b).
Regarding the human side, we recruited 77 mas-
ter workers from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk).
Each subject was asked to recognize 450 character
CAPTCHAs with Gaussian and adversarial distor-
tions in different levels respectively. Regarding the al-
gorithm side, we employed the state-of-the-art OCR
(Optimal Character Recognition) algorithm, which is
the segmentation-based approach for OCR works by
segmenting a text line image into individual character
images and then recognizing the characters [1]. The
resultant average recognition accuracies for Gaussian
and adversarially distorted CAPTCHAs are shown
in Fig. 2(c) and (d). We can see that, for Gaussian
distorted CAPTCHAs, human’s recognition accuracy
consistently declines as the distortion level increases,
indicating that Gaussian white noise tends to under-
mine human’s vision. On the contrary, the exam-
ined OCR algorithm demonstrates good immunity to
Gaussian white noise, possibly due to the noise re-
moval effect by multiple convolutional layers [12]. It
is easy to imagine that if we design CAPTCHA by
adding Gaussian white noise, as the noise level in-
creases, the resultant CAPTCHAs will critically con-
fuse humans instead of obstructing the cracking OCR
algorithms.
For adversarially distorted CAPTCHAs, we ob-
served quite opposite recognition results. Fig. 2(d)
shows that humans are more robust to the adversar-
ial perturbations, while OCR algorithm is highly vul-
nerable as the adversarial distortion increases. This
is not surprising since adversarial perturbation is spe-
cially crafted to change the algorithm decision under
the condition of not confusing human. This char-
acteristic of adversarial perturbation demonstrates
one important limitation of algorithm regards to hu-
man ability, which perfectly satisfies the requirement
of robust CAPTCHA: algorithm tends to fail, while
human remains successful. Therefore, we are moti-
vated to employ adversarial examples to design ro-
bust CAPTCHA to distinguish between algorithm
and human.
2.2 Characteristics Affecting Robust
CAPTCHA Design
The previous subsection observes that adversarial
perturbation is effective to mislead state-of-the-art
OCR algorithm, which shows its potential to be em-
ployed to design robust CAPTCHA. However, typical
CAPTCHA cracking solution involves beyond OCR,
e.g., image preprocessing operations like binarization
and Gaussian filtering will be applied to remove dis-
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tortions before issuing to the OCR module. Fig. 3(a)
illustrates the adversarially distorted CAPTCHA im-
ages before and after binarization preprocessing. It
is easy to conceive that the effectiveness of adversar-
ial perturbation will be critically affected by image
preprocessing operations.
We further quantified this affection by analyzing
the OCR performance on the same adversarially dis-
torted CAPTCHA images from previous subsection.
The recognition accuracies on the CAPTCHAs be-
fore and after binarization preprocessing are plotted
and compared in Fig. 3(b). It is shown that after re-
moving most distortions via image binarization, OCR
algorithm demonstrates basically stable performance
in recognizing CAPTCHAs with different levels of ad-
versarial perturbation. This tells us that standard
adversarial perturbation is insufficient to obstruct the
cracking method. It is necessary to design the robust
CAPTCHA solution considering the characteristics
(like preprocessing operations) of CAPTCHA crack-
ing method.
3 Methodology
As shown on the left of Fig. 4, typical cracking of
character-based CAPTCHA consists of two stages as
image preprocessing and OCR. The above data anal-
ysis has demonstrated that image preprocessing has
the effect of distortion removal, making it not pos-
sible to straightforwardly employ adversarial pertur-
bation for robust CAPTCHA design. In addition to
the image preprocessing stage, the OCR stage also
possesses characteristics obstructing CAPTCHA: (1)
sequential recognition, disabling the traditional sin-
gle character-oriented adversarial perturbation; and
(2) black-box crack, making it ineffective to attack
one specific OCR model. To address the above
characteristics of CAPTCHA cracking, our proposed
CAPTCHA generation framework consists of three
modules: multi-target attack, ensemble adversarial
training, and image preprocessing differentiable ap-
proximation. The proposed framework and its re-
lation to CAPTCHA cracking are illustrated on the
right of Fig. 4.
3.1 Multi-target Attack towards Se-
quential Recognition
Typical CAPTCHAs usually contain more than
one character for recognition, e.g., the example
CAPTCHAs contain 4 characters. Therefore, state-
of-the-art CAPTCHA cracking solutions are forced to
address a sequential character recognition problem at
the OCR stage [1]. Specifically, OCR stage consists
of three sub-modules as feature extraction, sequential
recognition, and output decoding. Feature extrac-
tion is basically realized by a convolutional neural
network to encoding the input image as neural fea-
ture. Sequential recognition is typically realized by
a recurrent neural network to process the issued im-
age neural feature and output multiple tokens includ-
ing characters (0-9, A-Z ) and blank token ∅2 Output
decoding serves to transform the sequential tokens
into final character recognition results, by merging
sequentially duplicated tokens and removing blank
∅ tokens. For example, the original token sequence
“aa∅b∅∅ccc∅dd” will be transformed to “abcd”.
While CAPTCHA cracking views OCR as a se-
quential recognition problem, standard adversarial
perturbation is designed to attack single target. In
this study, we propose to attack multiple targets cor-
responding to the multiple tokens derived from OCR
sequential recognition. The generated adversarial
CAPTCHA image is expected to simultaneously mis-
classify all the character tokens. For specific token
sequence t, all the characters appearing in t consti-
tute the original set Θ, while the remaining charac-
ters from (0-9, A-Z ) constitute the adversary set Θ¯.
Denoting the raw image as x and the corresponding
adversary image as x′, the multi-target attack is for-
mulated as the following optimization problem:
min
x′
d(x,x′)+λ ·
∑
θi∈Θ
[max
j 6=θ¯i
F (x′)θij −F (x′)θiθ¯i ]
+ (1)
where d(·, ·) is distance function to minimize the mod-
ification from x to x′3, λ is the weight parameter bal-
2 For typical 4 character-based CAPTCHAs, recurrent
neural network usually outputs 12-token sequence to im-
prove tolerance for segmentation and alignment [1].
3 Alternative choices for the distance function are al-
lowed. In our experiment, we use L2 distance.
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Figure 4: The proposed robust CAPTCHA designing framework.
ancing between the image modification and the mis-
classification confidence in the second term. Within
the second term, θi is the character appearing in the
original set Θ, θ¯i is its one-to-one mapping character
in the adversary set Θ¯, F (x′)θi denotes the output
of the second-to-last layer, the logits, corresponding
to token θi after sequential recognition, F (x
′)θij de-
notes its j dimension, and [f ]+ is the positive part
function denoting max(f, 0). Note that the one-to-
one mapping from θi to θ¯i can be either random or
fixed. Random one-to-one mapping leads to targeted
adversarial attack, and fixed mapping leads to non-
targeted adversarial attack4.
When the original set Θ contains only one charac-
ter, the multi-target attack reduces to single-target
attack as the standard adversarial perturbation. In
fact, according to the mechanism of output decoding
in CAPTCHA cracking, we only need to misclassify
any one of the character tokens to invalid the final
recognition result. The above equation in Eqn. 1 pro-
vides a general case of attacking flexible numbers of
character tokens. In practice, the number of attacked
characters is one importance parameter to control the
4 The reported experimental results in Section 4 are
based on random one-to-one mapping.
model performance. More attacked characters guar-
antee higher success rate to resist crack, yet leading to
more derived distortions and human recognition bur-
den. The quantitative influence of attacked character
number on the image distortion level and algorithm
recognition rate is discussed in Section 4.3.
3.2 Ensemble Adversarial Training
towards Black-box Crack
As mentioned in Section 1, CAPTCHA cracking
may employ multiple OCR algorithms for character
recognition. At the stage of designing CAPTCHA,
it is impractical to target towards one specific
OCR algorithm, which require to design adversar-
ial CAPTCHA images that are effective to as many
OCR algorithms as possible. Fortunately, it is rec-
ognized that adversarial perturbation is transferable
between models: if an adversarial image remains ef-
fective for multiple models, it is more likely to trans-
fer to other models as well [19]. Inspired by this, in
order to improve the resistance to unknown cracking
models, we propose to generate adversarial images
simultaneously misleading multiple models.
Specifically, given K white-box OCR models with
their corresponding the output of the second-to-last
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layer as J1, ..., JK , we re-formulate the objective func-
tion in Eqn. 1 by replacing F (x′) with F˜ (x′) defined
as follows:
F˜ (x′) =
K∑
k=1
αkJk(x
′) (2)
where αk is the ensemble weight with
∑K
k=1 αk = 1.
In most cases, αk = 1/K except that one model is
more important than others. Among the three sub-
modules of OCR stage, feature extraction has the
most model choices (e.g., various CNN structures as
GoogLeNet [23], ResNet [11]) which can be easily im-
plemented into different CAPTCHA cracking solu-
tions. Therefore, this study addresses the black-box
cracking issue by attacking multiple feature extrac-
tion models. Specifically, the training data and basic
structure of Ji(x
′) and F (x′) are identical except for
the different CNN structures in the feature extrac-
tion sub-module. On the number of CNN structures,
the larger the value of K, the stronger the generaliza-
tion capability of the derived adversarial CAPTCHA
images. However, an excessive K value will lead to
high computational complexity and trivial weight αk
to underemphasize single model. According to previ-
ous studies on ensemble adversarial attack [13], 3 ∼ 5
models achieve a good balance between transferabil-
ity and practicality. In this study, we select K = 4
and evenly set αk = 1/4. The performance of em-
ploying ensemble adversarial training to resist differ-
ent OCRs is reported in Section 4.4.
3.3 Differentiable Approximation to-
wards Image Preprocessing
The data observations in Section 2.2 demonstrate
the distortion removal consequences from binariza-
tion operation, requiring us to consider the affection
of image preprocessing in adversarial image genera-
tion. To address this, we regard image preprocessing
operation as part of the entire end-to-end solution so
that we can generate corresponding adversarial im-
ages effective to mislead the whole cracking solution.
According to the usability to be incorporated into
the end-to-end solution, image preprocessing opera-
tions can be roughly divided into two categories as
either differentiable or non-differentiable. For each
category, we select one representative operation to
address in this study, i.e., Gaussian filtering and im-
age binarization. Regarding the differentiable Gaus-
sian filtering operation, g(x′) = 1√
2piσ
e−
x
′2
2σ2 , we can
readily incorporate it into the OCR model (Eqn. 1,
Eqn. 2) by replacing the input image x′ with the pre-
processing image g(x′). Both forward and backward
propagation are conducted on the replaced function
F (g(x′)), leading to the generated adversarial images
expected to eliminate the affection from Gaussian fil-
tering.
Regarding the non-differentiable image binariza-
tion , we cannot straightforwardly incorporate it into
the objective function. Instead, we find a differen-
tiable approximation s(x′) to image binarization and
incorporate the approximated function into the end-
to-end solution. In this study, s(x′) is defined as
follows:
s(x′) =
1
1 + e−
x′−τ
ω
(3)
where τ denotes the threshold of image binarization,
ω denotes the degree of lateral expansion of the curve.
Note that to guarantee that the generated adversar-
ial images are resistent to image binarization, we only
employ the approximated s(x′) at the backward prop-
agation stage to update the generated image, while
the forward propagation still use the actual x′ to cal-
culate ∇xF (x).
To simultaneously resist to the affections from
Gaussian filtering and image binarization, we con-
catenate s(·) and g(·) in the final objective function.
Therefore, the overall optimization problem incorpo-
rating the three proposed modules is as follows:
min
x′
d(x,x′)+λ·
∑
θi∈Θ
[max
j 6=θ¯i
F˜ (φ(x′))θij −F˜ (φ(x′)))θiθ¯i ]
+
(4)
where F˜ (·) denotes the ensemble of multiple OCR
models defined in Eqn. 2, and φ(x′) = s(g(x′)) de-
notes the approximated image preprocessing opera-
tions defined in Eqn. 3.
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Table 1: The recognition of different complexity levels of CAPTCHAs in the different settings. The results
of algorithms are obtained after Gaussian filtering and image binarization.
Raw rCAPTCHA parallel rCAPTCHA w/o preprocessing rCAPTCHA
Easy
algorithm 100.0% 95.6% 68.4% 0.0%
human 99.0% 94.0% 94.0% 94.0%
Medium
algorithm 91.0% 88.0% 58.0% 0.0%
human 73.0% 51.0% 67.0% 65.0%
Hard
algorithm 81.0% 83.0% 45.0% 4.0%
human 56.0% 36.0% 51.0% 49.0%
Figure 5: Example images (top row) and theri atten-
tion maps (bottom row). From left to right, we show
the original image, the image with Gaussian white
noise, the adversarial generated by our method and
the adversarial image generated by our method but
without considering image preprocessing.
4 Experiments
We examined CAPTCHA images with 4 characters
for experiments. The CAPTCHAs are RGB im-
ages with resolution of 192 × 64px. Regarding the
cracking method, we considered image binarization
and Gaussian filtering (kernel size: 3 × 3, σ = 0.8)
at the image preprocessing stage. The OCR stage
is instantiated with CNN structures for feature ex-
traction and LSTM+softmax for sequential recog-
nition. Regarding our proposed CAPTCHA gener-
ation method, image binarization is approximated
with τ = 0.8, ω = 0.05, and 4 CNN structures are em-
ployed for ensemble adversarial training. All exper-
iments are conducted on Nvidia GTX 1080Ti GPU
with 11G memory.
4.1 Qualitative Attention Analysis
Visual attention has been widely used to explain
which region of image contributes much to the model
decision [26]. In this study, we extracted the atten-
tion map using Grad-CAM [21] to understand the
change of recognition performance under different vi-
sual distortions.
The first and second columns of Fig. 5 visualize
the attention map of the raw image and the image
with Gaussian white noise. It can be found that
Gaussian white noise brings trivial attention change
from the original image. Both attention maps keep
to the region where characters exist. This well ex-
plains the data observations in Section 2.1 that algo-
rithm is generally robust to Gaussian white noise. We
also visualized the attention map of the CAPTCHA
images generated from our proposed method on the
third column of Fig. 5. It is shown that the attention
maps deviate much from the original image and focus
on unrelated regions where there exist no characters.
This justifies our motivation to employ adversarial
perturbation to mislead the algorithm prediction re-
sult, and demonstrates the effectiveness of our pro-
posed CAPTCHA design method.
To further validate the necessity of considering im-
age preprocessing in robust CAPTCHA design, the
attention maps for the images generated from our
method but without considering image preprocessing
are shown on the fourth column of Fig. 5 for compar-
ison. It is easy to conceive that without considering
image preprocessing, the generated images fail to de-
viate the attention from the character regions. This
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is consistent with the fact that image preprocessing
has the effect of weakening or eliminating adversarial
perturbation.
4.2 Quantitative Performance Com-
parison
To compare the performance of the proposed ro-
bust CAPTCHA (rCAPTCHA) designing method,
we report the recognition accuracies of state-of-the-
art cracking solution under the following settings:
• Raw : the original CAPTCHA images without
adding adversarial perturbations;
• rCAPTCHA parallel : the proposed solution
to generated adversarial images, expect that
the sequential recognition sequential recognition
sub-module of OCR is replaced by 4 paral-
lel recognition networks (each realized by one
fully-connected layer) to address one character’s
recognition;
• rCAPTCHA w/o preprocessing : the proposed
solution to generated adversarial images, but
without considering the image preprocessing
stages;
• rCAPTCHA: the proposed solution to generated
adversarial images, considering both sequential
recognition and the image preprocessing opera-
tions.
The state-of-the-art cracking solution is trained
over 20, 000 CAPTCHA images with batch size 128.
To examine the application scope of the proposed
CAPTCHA generation methods, we conducted ex-
periments on the CAPTCHAs with three levels of
complexities: easy, medium, hard. Fig. 6 shows ex-
amples of different complexity levels of CAPTCHAs
in the above four settings. For each of the set-
tings, we selected/generated 500 CAPTCHA images
for testing, and summarize the derived average recog-
nition accuracy in Table 1. Experimental observa-
tions include: (1) By adding adversarial perturba-
tions, the right 3 columns consistently obtain lower
accuracies than the first column, showing the usabil-
ity of employing adversarial perturbations in resisting
CAPTCHA cracking. (2) Without considering the
sequential recognition or image preprocessing char-
acteristics, the resisting effect of rCAPTCHA parallel
and rCAPTCHA w/o preprocessing is not as obvious
as that of rCAPCHA. This validates the necessity
of multi-target attack and differentiable approxima-
tion modules. (3) Regarding CAPTCHAs with differ-
ent complexities, we observed consistent phenomenon
among the four settings, demonstrating the wide ap-
plication scope of the proposed CAPTCHA genera-
tion method.
The notable decrease in algorithm recognition ac-
curacies shows the effectiveness of employing adver-
sarial perturbation to mislead cracking solution. To
facilitate the correlation understanding between mis-
leading cracking solution and friendlity to human
recognition, we also provide the human recognition
accuracy for each experimental setting in Table 1.
Similar to the data analysis, we have recruited 164
workers from MTurk to recognize 4 character-based
CAPTCHA images. The reported accuracies are av-
eraged over 1, 200 CAPTCHAs. By comparing dif-
ferent rows, it is shown that the increasing content
complexity brings slight decrease of algorithm recog-
nition accuracy but causes huge trouble to human
recognition. Among different setting columns, while
the algorithm recognition accuracy fluctuates a lot,
the human recognition performance basically remains
stable, validating the different distortion vulnerabil-
ity between human and algorithm. In summary, re-
garding CAPTCHA images with different complex-
ities, the proposed CAPTCHA generation method
succeeds to invalid the cracking algorithm without
increasing human recognition burden.
4.3 Parameter Influence Analysis
The proposed robust CAPTCHA generation method
mainly involves with two parameters: the weight pa-
rameter λ in Eqn. 1 and the number of attacked char-
acters |Θ|. As introduced in the methodology, the
weight parameter λ controls the relative importance
between the visual distortion and misclassification
confidence. We adjusted λ within range of [10, 30]
with step of 1 and examined its influence on the de-
rived image distortion and cracking recognition accu-
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Table 2: Transferability of adversarial images generated between pairs of models. The element (i, j) repre-
sents the accuracy of the adversarial images generated for model i (row) tested over model j (column).
4ConvNet ResNet DenseNet GoogLeNet
4ConvNet 1% 3% 13% 7%
ResNet 8% 0% 13% 12%
DenseNet 16% 2% 3% 23%
Ensemble Training 0% 2% 1% 3%
Figure 6: Example CAPTCHAs with different
complexity levels (from top to bottom: easy,
medium, hard). Each row from left to right shows
the different settings of Raw, rCAPTCHA parallel,
rCAPTCHA w/o preprocessing and rCAPTCHA.
racy. The image distortion is measured as the sum
of squared pixel-wise difference between the original
and adversarial images. The averaged distortion and
recognition accuracy with the change of λ are drawn
in Fig. 7. It is shown that as λ increases, more im-
age distortion is observed in the derived CAPTCHA
images and cracking method tends to fail in recog-
nizing the generated CAPTCHAs. This is consis-
tent with the definition of λ in Eqn. 1. In practical
applications, to prevent annoying human subjects in
recognizing the generated CAPTCHAs, an appropri-
ate λ is selected with moderate image distortion and
guaranteed cracking resistent performance. Our ex-
perimental results reported in Section 4.2 are based
on λ = 20.
Regarding the number of attacked characters, we
set |Θ| to {1, 2, 3, 4} respectively and examined the
corresponding averaged image distortion and algo-
rithm recognition accuracy in Fig 9. As shown
in Fig 9(a), with |Θ| increases, more image dis-
tortion is needed to misclassify the characters. In
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Figure 7: The influence of λ on derived image distor-
tion and cracking recognition accuracy.
Fig. 8 we show example CAPTCHAs generated by
rCAPTCHA with different levels of image distor-
tions. Combing with Fig 9(a), it is demonstrated
that using the proposed rCAPTCHA method to at-
tack even all 4 characters, the derived CAPTCHAs
are generally friendly to human and not bringing ex-
tra recognition burden. As shown in Fig 9(b), the
increase of |Θ| enhances the confidence to mislead
the cracking algorithm and obtains consistently lower
recognition accuracy. With the introduction of multi-
attack towards sequential recognition, the proposed
10
Figure 8: Example CAPTCHAs with different im-
age distortions: from left to right shows images with
distortions of 100, 200, 300 and 400.
rCAPTCHA method possess the flexibility to attack
arbitrary number of characters. In our experiments,
to guarantee the resistent capability, we fixed |Θ| = 4.
4.4 Robustness towards Different
OCRs
To justify the generalization and transferability of our
proposed rCAPTCHA method, we implemented dif-
ferent cracking methods and examined their recogni-
tion accuracy on the generated CAPTCHAs. Specif-
ically, we respectively trained 4 OCR models with
different CNN structures, which are denoted as
4ConvNet, mini-ResNet, mini-DenseNet and mini-
GoogLeNet. 4ConvNet uses four convolutional layers
for feature extraction. mini-XNets are employed due
to the low resolution of CAPTCHA images: mini-
ResNet consists of five ResBlocks and two convolu-
tional layers, mini-DenseNet consists of four Dense-
Blocks with four convolutional layers, and mini-
GoogLeNet consists of two Inception modules with
six convolutional layers.
Among the 4 models, 3 models of 4ConvNet, mini-
ResNet, mini-DenseNet are selected as white-boxs,
with the remaining mini-GoogLeNet model as the
black-box. The black-box model is regard as the
potential OCR cracking to simulate the alternative
cracking choices in real-world applications. Averaged
over 100 tested CAPTCHAs, Table 2 summarizes the
black-box cracking recognition accuracy under differ-
ent training-testing pairs. For example, the value of
0% at element (1, 4) indicates the recognition accu-
racy trained with ensembled 3 white-box models and
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1 2 3 4
Algorithm recognition Number of characters attacked
(b) Algorithm recognition accuracy
Figure 9: The influence of |Θ| on derived image dis-
tortion and cracking recognition accuracy.
tested on 4ConvNet. Lower accuracy value means
superior resistent performance to cracking solutions
and better transferability of the method. We observe
that the adversarial images generated with one model
perform well on their own models (diagonal elements)
but generally perform poorly on other models. How-
ever, if we generate the CAPTCHA images with en-
semble training of 3 models, the testing recognition
accuracies for all 4 models are no higher than 3%
(the last row). This demonstrates the transferability
of the proposed rCAPTCHA method in employing
ensemble training towards black-box cracking. It is
expected with more models implemented in ensemble
training, the resistent performance towards arbitrary
black-box cracking methods will be guaranteed. In
practical applications, we can carefully select white-
box models with typically different structures to im-
prove the generalization and transferability to specific
models.
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5 CONCLUSION
This study designs robust character-based
CAPTCHAs to resist cracking algorithms by
employing their unrobustness to adversarial per-
turbation. We have conducted data analysis and
observed human and algorithm’s different vul-
nerabilities to visual distortions. Based on the
observation, robust CAPTCHA (rCAPTCHA) gen-
eration framework is introduced with three modules
of multi-target attack, ensemble adversarial training,
and differentiable approximation to image prepro-
cessing. Qualitative and quantitative experimental
results demonstrate the effectiveness of generated
CAPTCHAs in resisting cracking algorithms.
It is noted that similar to the game competition
between adversarial attack and defense, with more
CAPTCHA designers employing adversarial attack
to resist cracking, future cracking solutions are ex-
pected to employ adversarial defense techniques for
self-enhancement. We hope this study could draw at-
tention of future CAPTCHA designing on the compe-
tition between adversarial attack and defense. More-
over, with the development of deep learning and
other AI algorithms, we are confronted with critical
security-related problems when algorithms are mali-
ciously utilized towards human. In this case, it is
necessary to get aware of the limitations of current
algorithms and appropriately employ them to resist
the abuse use of algorithms.
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